Sticky-price models with rational expectations fail to capture the inertia in U.S. inflation. Models with backward-looking expectations capture current inflation behavior, but are unlikely to fit other monetary regimes. This paper seeks to overcome these problems with a nearrational model of expectations. In the model, agents make univariate forecasts of inflation: they use information on past inflation optimally, but they ignore other variables. The paper tests sticky-price models with near-rational expectations for two periods in U.S. history, the post-1960 period of persistent inflation and the period from 1879 to 1914, when inflation was not persistent. The models fit the data for both periods; in contrast, both rationalexpectations and backward-looking models fail for at least one period.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can we explain the short-run behavior of output and inflation? Since Fischer (1978) , many researchers have sought to do so with models that combine nominal price stickiness and rational expectations. Currently, the most popular models of this kind are Taylor's (1980) and Calvo's (1983) models of staggered price adjustment.
Unfortunately, recent work shows that these models fail to fit key facts about the macroeconomy. In particular, the models are inconsistent with the inertia in real-world inflation --the persistent effects of shocks to inflation, and the output costs of reducing inflation (e.g. Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Roberts, 1998; Mankiw, 2000) .
In searching for better models, some authors suggest relaxing the assumption of rational expectations. They argue that some or all agents have "backward-looking" expectations: expected inflation equals past inflation (e.g. Ball, 1991; Roberts, 1997; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) . Roberts (1998) and Fuhrer (1998) show that the canonical staggered-price-setting model fits the data much better when backward-looking behavior is introduced. However, backward-looking models were rejected in the 1970s for a good reason: the Lucas (1976) critique. While the models fit the behavior of inflation in the current monetary regime, expectations are likely to change if monetary policy changes. Therefore, backward-looking models produce misleading predictions about the effects of policy shifts.
Thus researchers face a dilemma: rational-expectations models fail to fit key facts, but backward-looking models are subject to the Lucas critique. This paper looks for a solution to this dilemma. I propose a less-than-fully-rational model of expectations that is applicable to any monetary regime. The deviation from rationality is that agents use only a limited set of information to forecast future variables. Specifically, in forecasting inflation, they use only the past behavior of inflation. They use this univariate information optimally, but they do not use information on other variables, such as output or interest rates. Following Akerlof and Yellen (1985a) , I interpret this behavior as a "near-rational" approach to forecasting that reduces the costs of gathering and processing information.
For the postwar United States, my assumption is close to the assumption of backward-looking expectations. For this period, the univariate behavior of inflation is close to a random walk; thus lagged inflation is close to an optimal univariate forecast of inflation. However, my model does not assume that backward-looking expectations are a fixed feature of the economy. In other monetary regimes, the univariate process for inflation can differ greatly from a random walk. In such regimes, expected inflation differs greatly from lagged inflation.
After discussing alternative theories of expectations, I embed the theories in simple sticky-price models and test their implications. Since the goal is to capture shifts in behavior 3 across regimes, I test the models using data from two different periods in U.S. history. The first is the period from 1960 to the present, when inflation has been highly persistent. The second is the period from 1879 through 1914, when the U.S. had a gold standard. In that period, the univariate process for inflation was close to white noise. As a result, my assumption of univariate forecasts implies that expected inflation was close to a constant.
Like previous researchers, I find that sticky-price models fail badly at fitting the data under the assumption of rational expectations.
For the post-1960 period, the assumption of backward-looking expectations fits the data well, again as others have found, but this result does not carry over to the period before 1914. Models with backward-looking expectations imply persistent effects of inflationary shocks that do not exist in the pre-1914 data. In contrast to these failures, my new assumption of optimal univariate expectations performs well for both historical periods. With these expectations, sticky-price models fit both the inflation persistence in the later period and the lack of persistence in the earlier period.
The rest of this paper contains seven sections. Section II discusses current models of expectations and Section III proposes my new approach. Section IV discusses the two historical periods that I study, Section V describes my sticky-price models, and that it implies (Roberts, 1995) . Goodfriend and King (1997) argue that the Taylor-Calvo model with rational expectations is part of a "new synthesis" in macroeconomics, and the model has become a standard tool for analyzing alternative monetary policies (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; McCallum and Nelson, 1999) .
Unfortunately, recent research shows that the Taylor-Calvo model fails to capture a central feature of the modern economy:
inflation inertia. For the postwar United States, there is strong evidence that shocks to inflation have persistent effects, and reducing inflation requires substantial output losses (e.g. Christiano et al., 1994; Romer and Romer, 1989; Ball, 1994) . Recent authors use a variety of techniques to show that the Taylor-Calvo model cannot fit these facts if one assumes rational expectations.
For example, Gali and Gertler (1999) show that the model produces a perverse Phillips curve: higher output leads to a fall in inflation. Similarly, Mankiw (2000) shows that the model produces implausible responses to monetary shocks, with output and inflation 5 moving in opposite directions. These counterfactual predictions make the model an unreliable tool for policy analysis.
Of course, what the data reject is the combination of rational expectations with the particular specifications of price setting chosen by Taylor and Calvo. In principle, the Taylor-Calvo model might be modified to make it fit the data under rational expectations.
Researchers such as Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , and Gali and Gertler explore variations on the model. However, no consensus has emerged on whether these variations are successful in fitting the facts. Thus other researchers, and this paper, take a different approach:
relaxing the assumption of rational expectations.
B. Backward-Looking Expectations
Until the 1970s, the standard model of expectations was backward-looking: expected inflation was assumed to equal lagged inflation (or an average of several lags). Given the empirical failures of rational-expectations models, some researchers have suggested a return to backward-looking models, or models with both backward-looking and rational agents (e.g. Ball, 1991; Roberts, 1997) . Backward-looking behavior helps explain inflation inertia:
since firms choose prices based on expected inflation, backwardlooking expectations make inflation depend on lagged inflation. Roberts (1998) shows that the Taylor-Calvo model fits the data much better when he assumes that some price setters are backward-looking than when he assumes rational expectations for all. This reasoning suggests that we can interpret backward-looking expectations as a "near-rational rule of thumb" (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985a) . It is costly to gather and process the information needed for fully rational inflation forecasts. Some large firms pay these costs --they hire economists to build forecasting models and monitor the Fed. For the local pizza parlor, however, the costs of these activities are larger than the gains from improved inflation forecasts. So the pizza parlor uses the inexpensive and reasonably accurate rule of setting expected inflation equal to past inflation. This justification for near-rational inflation forecasting parallels justifications for near-rational behavior in price adjustment (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985b) and in consumption (Cochrane, 1989 Phillips curves have smaller coefficients on lagged inflation than postwar Phillips curves (Gordon, 1980; Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991 My model of expectations has many antecedents. In the early days of rational expectations, Sargent (1973) and McCallum (1976) discussed the idea that expectations might be based on univariate forecasts, calling this model "partly rational expectations."
McCallum suggests that lagged inflation rates are the variables "most likely to be considered by market participants" in forecasting inflation. More recently, applied researchers such as Staiger et al. (1997) use univariate forecasts as proxies for expected inflation when estimating Phillips curves.
At a broader level, I follow a number of authors who seek to explain inflation behavior with deviations from rationality. For example, "bounded rationality" is central to Sargent's recent interpretation of U.S. inflation history (although Sargent emphasizes bounded rationality on the part of policymakers rather than private agents). Lucas's (1973) model of the Phillips curve is another inspiration for my work, although Lucas calls the friction in his model "imperfect information" rather than nearrationality. In both Lucas's model and mine, agents ignore certain observable variables --in his case, they ignore the price level in estimating relative prices --but they use the information they do 11 collect optimally. Thus my model builds on a theme that is common to such diverse researchers as Lucas, Sargent, and Akerlof-Yellen.
Since my model is just one kind of near-rational expectations, future research should explore others. One can imagine expectations that are closer to full rationality; for example, agents might use data on output as well as inflation to forecast future inflation, while still ignoring interest rates. Or expectations could be farther from rationality; agents might use AR-1 models of inflation rather than optimal ARIMA models. A generalization of my model might include a mixture of fullyrational and less-than-rational agents, following Roberts (1997) and others. Future work can ask which variation on nearrationality best captures the behavior of inflation.
IV. EXPECTATIONS IN TWO MONETARY REGIMES
In Sections VI and VII below, I test macroeconomic models with univariate expectations in two historical periods. As preliminary steps, this section describes the two periods and presents evidence on what kinds of expectations are near-rational in each of them.
A. The Two Periods
The first period I examine is the current regime of highly persistent inflation, which I date from 1960 through the present (my data end in 1999). Some authors consider the entire period since World War II, but Barsky (1987) The other period I examine is the gold-standard era from 1879 through 1914. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that there were important regime shifts in 1879, when the U.S. returned to the gold standard, and in 1914, when the Federal Reserve was established. As discussed above, previous work finds that inflation was close to white noise during this period --the price level was close to a random walk. Shocks such as gold discoveries and shifts in money demand produced one-time changes in the price level.
I reexamine the inflation process for 1879-1914 using the two leading series for the output deflator, those of Balke and Gordon (1989) and Romer (1989) . For each series, Table I Both models are based on the canonical macroeconomic model of imperfect competition (Romer, 1996, ch. 6 ), but they differ in the timing of price changes. The first model follows Taylor (1979) 
A. The Model with Staggered Adjustment
The economy contains a large number of imperfectly competitive firms. Each firm's desired price in period t is given by (1) where p* is the desired nominal price, p is the aggregate price level, and y is aggregate output (all variables are in logs).
Equation (1) can be derived from profit-maximization when firms have isoelastic cost and demand functions (Romer, ch. 6 ).
Intuitively, a rise in output shifts out each firm's demand curve, raising its desired relative price.
In this version of the model, a firm sets a fixed price for two periods. Let x t denote the price set by firms in period t for t and t+1. This price is chosen after firms observe the state of the economy at t. Following Taylor (1979) and Roberts (1995) , firms set x t equal to the average of expected optimal prices at t and t+1: (2) where E t denotes firms' expectations at time t. Note that E t may or may not equal a mathematical expectation, depending on whether we assume rational expectations.
Price setting is staggered, with equal numbers of firms adjusting each period. Thus the price level p t is the average of x t and x t-1 : 
where I add an error ε t to capture inflation shocks not explained by the model. I assume that ε t is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with y t .
Equation (4) A fraction w of firms, the "sticky-price" 3 Equation (4) is similar to equation (8) in Roberts (1995) . Roberts, however, writes the equation differently. He replaces the term E t-1 π t with π t + u t , where u t is an expectational error (u t ≡ E t-1 π t -π t ). Making this substitution and rearranging leads to (4') π t = E t π t+1 + v (y t + E t y t+1 + y t-1 + E t-1 y t ) + 2 ε t + u t .
Here, the only inflation expectation that appears explicitly is E t π t+1 -the Phillips curve appears to be fully "forward-looking." But E t-1 π t enters the equation through the error u t . (This result depends on Taylor's assumption of fixed intervals between price adjustments. As shown by Roberts, Calvo's assumption of random adjustments produces a version of (4') without the u t term. sector, must set prices one period in advance.
They set their prices equal to the expected optimal price:
The other firms, the "flexible-price" sector, set prices after observing the current state. Their prices are
I include the flexible-price sector to allow output to have some effect on inflation within a period.
The aggregate price level is a weighted average of p s and p f :
This equation and (1), (5), and (6) lead to
Subtracting p t-1 from each side yields another Phillips curve:
where I again add an error ε t . This equation is similar in spirit to the earlier Phillips curve: inflation depends on expected inflation and output terms. However, the dynamic structure is simpler than before. (10) where u t is an expectational error (u t ≡ (1/2) (E t-1 π t -π t ) + (v/2) (E t-1 y ty t )). Note there are two expectational errors, u t and u t+1 , because equation (4) includes expectations of variables at t and t+1.
VI. TESTING THE MODEL WITH STAGGERING
Equation (10) There is a straightforward explanation for the model's failure. For v>0, equation (11) gives a positive relation between π t -π t+1 and an average of output from t-1 to t+1. π t -π t+1 equals -∆π t+1 , so this means a negative relation between output and the change in (4), and show that the parameter v has the correct sign.
In this version of the model, I replace the expected inflation terms in equation (4) with optimal univariate forecasts. For consistency, I assume that output expectations are also given by univariate forecasts. Semi-annual inflation forecasts are generated by an AR-4 model for ∆π with coefficients ρ 1 ,..,ρ 4 ; output forecasts are generated by an AR-4 with coefficients β 1 ,...,β 4 .
These assumptions determine the expectations in (4) Thus, in contrast to the case of rational expectations, the estimated v has the positive sign predicted by theory. To understand why, recall that inflation is close to a random walk in the post-1960 period; thus, with univariate forecasts, E t-1 π t is close to π t-1 . Roberts and others have shown that replacing E t-1 π t with π t-1 helps staggered-price-setting models fit the data.
Specifically, if this substitution is made in equation (4), the equation reduces to a positive relation between ∆π and output -the
Phillips curve that appears in the data.
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The estimated parameters substituted into equation (12) are ρ 1 =0.029, ρ 2 =0.049, ρ 3 =-0.084, ρ 4 =-0.099, β 1 =1.237, β 2 =-0.476, β 3 =-0.114, and β 4 =0.068. In principle, my use of generated coefficients makes the OLS standard error for v invalid (Pagan, 1984) . My problem is sufficiently non-standard that it is difficult to generate the correct standard error. However, Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the OLS standard error is close to correct in this application. I generate artificial data that mimic the outputinflation dynamics in the true data using a VAR for y and ∆π and bootstrap techniques. I create 50,000 artificial data sets, each the same size as the true data set (80 observations). For each artificial sample, I estimate v using my two-step procedure. The standard deviation of the estimated v's across samples is 0.015. This bootstrap standard error is close to the OLS standard error of 0.014. In equation (4), I substitute π t-1 for E t-1 π t and π t for E t π t+1 . I assume that output expectations are also backward-looking and substitute lagged output for expected output. Equation (4) reduces to (13) The OLS estimate of the parameter v is 0.056 with a standard error of 0.013. Equation (13) is another restricted version of the atheoretical Phillips curve. In Table III , the third column gives the Phillips-curve coefficients implied by (13) 
27 where u t ≡ E t-1 π t -π t + v (E t-1 y t -y t ). The π t 's cancel out, leaving
One can again estimate the output coefficient, v/w, by instrumental variables. Since the left side of (15) is zero, the estimate is obviously zero. This implies v=0, which contradicts the model's assumption of v>0.
To see the problem more intuitively, consider the model's implications when v>0. In this case, equation (9) gives a positive relation between π t -E t-1 π t and actual and expected output. Thus variables that help forecast output also help forecast π t -E t-1 π t . This result contradicts rational expectations, which implies that π t -E t-1 π t is unforecastable.
These results depend, of course, on the model's simple timing of price adjustment. As shown earlier, the staggered-adjustment model with rational expectations produces an estimate of v which is negative rather than zero. However, both a zero v and a negative v violate theory. The failure of rational expectations is a robust result, although the failure takes different forms in the two price-setting models.
B. Optimal Univariate Expectations
Like the earlier model with staggering, the model with oneperiod prices fits the data fairly well if one assumes optimal univariate expectations. I show this is true for annual data from both 1960-1999 and 1879-1914 .
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The Model's Phillips Curve: With annual data, I use the forecasting models for inflation in Table I : an AR-2 for ∆π in the post-1960 period and an AR-2 for the level of π in the pre-1914 period. In both periods I use an AR-2 for output to measure output expectations. For each period, I substitute the forecasting models into equation (9) and obtain inflation in terms of lagged inflation and current and lagged output. I omit these equations, which are the analogues of equation (12) for the model with staggering. Once estimates of the AR coefficients are substituted in, there are two free parameters, the coefficients on E t-1 y t and y t in (9). In terms of underlying parameters, these coefficients equal v and (1-w)v/w. Table IVA Again paralleling earlier analysis, I test the restrictions that the model places on an atheoretical Phillips curve. Table IVB   29 presents unrestricted Phillips curves and the Phillips curves implied by equation (9) Previous papers such as Gordon (1980) and Algoskoufis-Smith With backward-looking expectations, I substitute π t-1 for E t-1 π t and y t-1 for E t-1 y t in equation (9). I then estimate the equation's two coefficients by OLS. Again paralleling earlier analysis, Table VB To derive the restricted impulse responses for the pre-1914 period, I again set the coefficient on E t-1 y t to zero in equation (9) and reestimate the coefficient on y t . The new y t coefficient is 0.17 for the Romer data and 0.08 for output and inflation. I hope this approach yields more credible results than policy analysis based on fully rational expectations (e.g. McCallum and Nelson, 1999) or backward-looking expectations (e.g. Ball, 1999 
